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Daniel D. Hutto & Shaun
Gallagher

Abstract: Narrative practices have the potential to play
a robust part in strategies for self-managing psychosocial well-being. Narrative therapy in particular seeks to
empower groups and individuals, providing them with
the resources and skills needed for positively improving
their own well-being and coping with a wide range of
life challenges. However, narrative therapy is in need
of a philosophical update and some theoretical finetuning. Re-authoring some key elements of narrative
therapy’s official narrative will not only improve our
understanding of it but increase the chances of a wider
uptake of self-management strategies. Some features of
narrative therapy’s self-understanding invite and require
clarification or adjustment in order to benefit from new
thinking in philosophy and the cognitive sciences.
Keywords: narrative therapy, folk psychology, self,
self-management, cognitive science

H

ow we narrate our lives can affect us,
for good or ill. Our narrative practices
make an undeniable difference to our
psychosocial well-being. All so-called “talking
cures” – including traditional psychoanalytic and
psychodynamic approaches to therapy and newer
techniques – are motivated by this insight about
the power of personal narratives. All therapies of
the discursive ilk make use of narratives, in one
way or another, as a means of enabling individu-
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als to frame, or reframe, and to manage their life
circumstances in richer or new ways (Lock &
Strong, 2012).
Narrative Therapy (hereafter NT), an important sub-class of talking therapies, breaks faith
with more traditional psychodynamic approaches
in adopting a not-knowing interactive stance. NT,
developed by White and Epston in the early 1990s,
stands out in seeking to empower individuals and
groups by getting them to look again at their habits
of self-narration and to explore the possibility of
telling new stories about their individual or collective lives: “As people become more narratively
resourced . . . they find that they have available
to them options for action that would not have
otherwise been imaginable” (White, 2011, p. 5,
emphasis added). The aim of NT is to expand the
individual’s or group’s “options in self-formation”
(White, 2004, p. 43).
NT practitioners pursue this aim by helping
individuals or groups to re-author or re-story
conversations, enabling them to see new avenues
for action and by improving their capacities to
respond to such affordances. In terms of its ambitions and style, NT “seeks to be a respectful, nonblaming approach to counseling and community
work, which centers people as the experts in their
own lives” (Morgan, 2000, p. 4). In short, NT uses
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special techniques in order to provide the tools
that enable people take responsibility for their
own mental to health and exercise their agency
in maintaining it in positive ways. NT equips
individuals with powerful tools that can enhance
the self-management of mental healthcare.
Although NT is very much in the mold of “talking cures”, it does not seek to understand past
causes of current trauma through such means.
NT’s working assumption is: “Change the overarching narrative representation and deeper and
more extensive opportunities for engaging in novel
behaviors can be achieved” (Russell et al., 2004,
p. 215). Consequently, its main aim is to use narrative techniques to get people to construct a more
positive “future trajectory rather than achieving
past accuracy” (Graham, 2010, p. 14).
Decades after its inception, NT is now well
established in practice. NT is widely used as a
basis for personal, family and community intervention and treatment around the world. It is
especially popular in Australia and New Zealand,
where it originated, having its main base in the
Dulwich Centre, Adelaide which was founded in
1984. Other Centers and Institutes of NT have
been established in parts of the English-speaking
world, Canada, the UK and USA. Although there
is limited scientific evidence of the efficacy of NT,
it enjoys a reputation as providing an attractive
means of supporting people from diverse backgrounds. For example, NT has been used to help
people deal with a wide range of problems, from
asthma, anorexia, bulimia, depression and other
psychiatric illnesses to trauma (Murdoch, 2009,
p. 494). As such, it has the potential to inform
approaches to self-management in mental health
care. This is especially so on the assumption that
the sorts of narrative skills, once acquired, can be
deployed independently, without continued reliance on therapists.
Despite its successes, NT is in need of a philosophical update and some theoretical fine-tuning.
By re-authoring some key elements of narrative
therapy’s official narrative, the therapy itself will
be afforded new possibilities for development and
wider uptake. This paper provides an initial analysis of some features of narrative therapy’s selfunderstanding that invite and require clarification

or adjustment if it is to benefit from new thinking
in and a wider engagement with philosophy and
the cognitive sciences.
Section 1 reviews NT’s official story about its
working methods and theoretical assumptions.
Section 2 shows that certain of NT’s central assumptions – about science, folk psychology and
the self – are in need of revision so as to enable
NT’s further theoretical and practical development. Section 3 supplies first pass answers about
how NT might revise its narrative concerning these
assumptions in order to become more internally
coherent and to enter into a more positive and
cooperative relationship with sciences of the mind.
The concluding Section 5 briefly summarizes how
the future development of NT along the theoretical
lines we propose opens up promising new possibilities for NT to feature in self-management
mental healthcare strategies.

Narrative therapy: The
official story
One of NT’s central tenets is that deficiencycentered stories limit options for action (White,
2004, p. 34). Such stories pathologize and disempower people by making it seem as if their
problems are an essential part of who they are. In
general, prêt-à-porter narratives – those inherited
uncritically from the surrounding culture – tend
to foster such negative and limited ways of thinking. Such narratives restrict a person’s vision and
capacities for self-understanding by presenting
only a limited array of options. Those who operate
with such “thin” narratives perceive fewer of the
genuine possibilities for action, fewer affordances.
The danger, as NT practitioners point out, is
that “All too often, the stories we believe about
ourselves have been written by others” (Denborough, 2014, p. 8). In passively buying into and
repeating narrow and negative narratives we
unnecessarily restrict our life possibilities. NT
guards against this by questioning such narratives,
insisting on the need for people to reclaim and
take back their “storytelling rights” (Denborough,
2014, p. 8, 10, 22). The practices of NT help
people to reclaim these rights, by enabling them
“to break from thin conclusions about their lives,
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about their identities, and about their relationships” (White, 2000, p. 4). This way of seeing the
landscape of therapy is connected to one of NT’s
grounding post-structuralist assumptions that “it
is not one’s motive that shapes action, but one’s
account of one’s motive that has been socially
derived in narrative negotiations that does so”
(White, 2000, p. 4).
Chief amongst NT’s tools for combatting such
life-limiting stories is that of externalizing conversations that “open options for people to redefine or
revise their relationships with a problem” (White,
2004, p. 32; Murdoch, 2009, p. 501). NT’s favorite slogan is that “the person is not the problem,
the problem is the problem” (Denborough, 2014,
p. 26). The crucial move in getting clients to see
this is to get them to abandon the idea that the
problem is a crippling, essential feature of the individual or group and come to treat it as something
apart and distinct from themselves – something
that can be addressed and dealt with by means
of a number of strategies. NT thus “refuses to
locate problems inside people . . . [it] refuses to
pathologize people” (Denborough, 2014, p. 26).
The main NT strategy is to find new, richer
stories to tell about one’s life, and thus augment
one’s resources; this involves finding and attending
to so-called “unique outcomes” – those “sparkling
moments” – in which one’s problem did not impede the living of life; those times at which one
had the strength and means to deal with it effectively or to put it aside (Murdoch, 2009, p. 500;
Denborough, 2014, p. 49). The end result of this
process of re-storying, if all goes well, is increased
“response-ability” – enabling people to become
“more able to respond” (Denborough, 2014,
p. 36). This involves developing and mobilizing
one’s practical know-how and life skills (White,
2004, p. 39, 40). Once these new self-management
capacities are established, further NT conversations help to provide the necessary support and
scaffolding to ensure that the new, richer storylines
and the expanded possibilities for action associated with them take root and flourish.
The crucial point is that by shifting one’s thinking, so that problems are externalized, new ways
of being and new possibilities for action are put
on the table. All of this works because narratives

■ 159

are necessarily selective. Whichever story we tell
about our lives there are always other options
– possibilities that were not foregrounded, not
mentioned, not attended to. Any story of the days
of our lives – even a single day of our lives – is
never the whole story. Hence “there are many different events in our lives, but only some of them
get formed into the storylines of our identities”
(Denborough, 2014, p. 6).
As such it need not be that a dominant story is
false; it is enough that a dominant story is limited
and partial, occluding alternative storylines that
can possibly “provide the gateway or point of
entry to the exploration of other knowledges of
life and other skills of living or practices of life
that are cultural and historical” (White, 2011,
p. 9). By taking a fresh and fuller look at their
own lives people can explore healthier possibilities
for narrating it – they can “rework or rewrite the
storylines of identity” (Denborough, 2014, p. 3,
21). Here it is important to recognize that NT
does not view the alternative storylines it helps to
foster as radically constructed (see White, 2004,
p. 43; White, 2011, p. 9). On the contrary, they are
deemed more realistic, fuller accounts of one’s life.

Problematic Stories: Science,
Folk Psychology and Self
Given the way NT seeks to retrain and empower individuals it has great promise to add to
the range of self-managed approaches to mental
health, but it needs updating. Certain familiar
philosophical assumptions about the nature of
science, folk psychology, and selves are obscuring
a healthier understanding of NT, and are removing or reducing fruitful opportunities for NT to
engage with the best philosophy and science of
the mind. Put otherwise, it appears that dominant
stories about science, folk psychology and selves,
embraced or endorsed by leading NT practitioners,
may be standing in the way of valuable possibilities
for NT’s future theoretical, scientific and practical
investigation, assessment and development. We
identify three main sources of tension.
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Conflating Scientism with science
NT subscribes to a constructivist framework
that promotes the view that social realities are
something that we can create and construct for
ourselves, even if not radically. In this NT is
directly inspired by the interpretive turn made
prominent by French postmodernists. In adhering
to a post-structuralist framework NT opposes the
sort of exclusive scientific realism associated with
grand narratives about science (see Murdoch,
2009, p. 491, 494). NT justifiably rejects the idea
that there is one and only one true story to be told
about ourselves and the world – especially when,
to this basic claim, it is added that such a story
must be told, in the end, in the vocabulary of the
hard sciences – preferably, if possible, only in the
language of physics. Following in Foucault’s footsteps, NT practitioners treat this claim as part and
parcel of “the ‘grand abstractions’ of reductionist
science . . . [abstractions that have] dehumanized
and objectified people” (Combs & Freedman,
2004, p. 139).
There are certainly many excellent reasons to be
suspicious of and indeed hostile towards exclusive,
reductionist “scientistic grand narratives” (see
Putnam, 1990; Hutto, 2000). Yet those reasons
are not good reasons to be suspicious of truth,
objectivity or the sciences – when understood in
a suitably modest fashion.
Philosophically speaking, if postmodern suspicions about truth and objectivity are overplayed
it becomes difficult to make sense of how NT is
meant to work in practice in a way consistent with
NT’s official story. For it is not as if NT avoids
commitment to the idea that there are truths
about our lives that outstrip the stories we tell
about them. Rather it claims that as, “we retell
and rewrite the stories of our life, the facts of our
lives won’t change, but their meaning will change”
(Denborough, 2014, p. 21). Yet it is not just the
meanings we adopt that change in such cases,
our practices and underlying skill sets alter too.
Something over and above our narrative choices
changes in the process. After all, NT assumes that
through narrative practice we can reshape our
current life and thereby alter future possibilities
for engagement. This is precisely why “it makes a
real difference how we talk about the problems in

our lives” (Denborough, 2014, p. 242, emphasis
added).
The stories we tell about ourselves either open
up or close down affordances and therefore make
factual, existential differences to possibilities for
living our lives. We can alter the possibilities
for living a life by narrating that life differently.
These ideas are at the very heart of NT. Through
re-authoring one comes “to attach significance
to some . . . previously neglected events” (White,
2011, p. 5). And by attaching significance individuals contribute “to possibilities for significantly
different responses to the events of their lives”
(White, 2011, p. 6).
Practically speaking, the hostility some NT
practitioners bear towards scientistic grand narratives has apparently led, through guilt by association, to unnecessarily hostile relations between NT
and the empirical sciences. NT practitioners typically shun formal, empirical assessments, allegedly
for two main reasons: “First, traditional models
of assessment assume a single reality to which the
therapist has access. Second, these processes tend
to be pathology-oriented and may ignore cultural
or other contextual factors” (Murdoch, 2009,
p. 499). A bad consequence of NT’s steering clear
of the empirical sciences, however, is that “little
traditional theory testing or outcome research can
be found that is specific to NT counseling” (Murdoch, 2009, p. 513).1 The lack of proper empirical
credentials has in turn resulted in NT not being
deemed a scientifically respectable form of therapy
by mainstream researchers and practitioners.
The mutual antagonism between NT and scientific approaches to mind and mental health works
to keep NT “outside the mainstream elaboration
of psychotherapy by university-based research and
training programmes” (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 53,
Vromans & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 5). By developing
healthier relations with the sciences of the mind,
NT can avoid being “on the fringe” – of being the
sort of approach that mainstream mental health
and policymakers are likely to systematically
ignore, or at least marginalize. Addressing this is
important to prevent them from overlooking and
underrating NT’s unique story-based and valuable
form of therapy.
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Shallow and Culturally Biased Folk
Psychology
Another major reason why NT is not better
and more widely received is that it is fundamentally committed to folk psychology (hereafter FP)
(White, 2004). The trouble is that FP “hasn’t fared
that well in the arena of professional psychologies. It is lowly ranked and marginalized by these
psychologies” (White,p. 2004, 20). FP is arguably
best thought of as a kind of domestic anthropology – one “mired in biases of local culture” (see
e.g., Stich, 1983, Hutto, 2008). As such, FP explanations don’t run very deep. Let’s consider these
worries in reverse order.
There is every reason to doubt that FP explanations get at the true causes of action. Hence,
if it is assumed that NT’s main therapeutic task
depends on having a deep understanding of the
mind then NT runs into trouble since FP explanations are “not up to the sophistication and rigor
required by modern psychology” (White, 2004,
p. 20). Essentially, when it comes to explaining
the basic mechanics and dynamics of the mind,
FP is viewed as being unscientific and naïve in
its conceptions. In a word, FP is just too shallow
and “folksy” to be a respectable part of a proper
science of the mind needed for illuminating the
basis of psychopathologies. For:
mind has an existence and substantive character
that goes well beyond, and is independent of our
best commonsense interpretative practices. Hence
knowing the truth about the mind requires a
great deal more than informed reflection on those
practices. In fact, it requires cognitive science
(Carruthers, 2011, p. xiv).

We agree with Carruthers that cognitive science, not folk psychology, reveals the basic nature
of minds. We disagree with him in thinking that
cognitive science will end up endorsing some form
of classic cognitivism. Nevertheless, the above
remarks highlight the need for NT to take stock
of debates about the fundamental nature of minds
if it is to properly situate its form of therapy and
justify it within a wider set of possible approaches.
Making this effort would also allow NT to benefit
from new findings in cognitive science that could
shed light on how narratives play their part in
changing attitudes and habits.
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What about the cultural bias worry? NT is
“shaped” and “informed” by an FP tradition that
lays great stress on notions of (1) personal agency
as driven by (2) intentional attitudes (beliefs, desires, hopes) and how they interact (White, 2004,
p. 20, 28, 49). To construe FP in this way, and to
make it foundational to the thinking behind NT –
part of its very basis – renders NT culturally biased
and skewed, despite its best intentions.
This is ironic, given NT’s appeal to post-structuralism, since the emphasis on personal agency
and intentional states is arguably a feature of the
Western, Eurocentric “theory of mind”– a “reflection of this folk psychology’s theory of mind”
(White, 2004, p. 20, emphasis added). White
claims that such an emphasis “is still strongly
featured in the great majority of folk psychological
accounts of human action” (White, 2004, p. 20).
That may well be true of WEIRD people (those
from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich,
and Democratic countries) but there is evidence
of divergent practices too, that some people from
other cultures favor other styles of FP explanations (see Hutto, 2008; Fiebich, 2014; Hutto &
Kirchhoff, forthcoming). As a result, so long as
NT gives pride of place to a peculiarly Western
form of FP at its basis, “NT can’t just be blindly
applied in cultures other than the ones in which it
originated” (Murdoch, 2009, p. 511).2
It is well known that “Effective cultural consultation requires an awareness of the constraints
of [power, prejudice, identity and cultural dissonance] on clinicians’ agency, engagement and
positioning as well as on clients” (Guzder, 2014
p. 164). NT therapists actively and sensitively
adjust their practices in light of cross-cultural differences. For example, therapists working within
an overwhelmingly white Australian culture
reshape their therapeutic practice significantly
when dealing with Aboriginal communities (see,
e.g. Denborough et al., 2006). African and Palestinian NT practitioners – who operate in contexts
where the we/I balance differs than in conceptions
of Western folk psychology – must modify and
even sometimes invent their own forms of narrative practice. Over last 20 years, The Dulwich
Centre has actively sought to ensure its approach
is appropriately sensitive to such differences in
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outlook through cross-cultural partnerships. To
complete this work NT also needs to update the
official vision of folk psychology that informs its
background philosophy in line with these adjustments to its practice.

conceive of the self that is, at once, both the agent
and the patient self-management.

Subjected selves

In the limited space available, we want to sketch
some positive revisions to NT concerning the three
topics identified above that will overcome the
sorts of theoretical and practical difficulties NT
currently encounters. This is a prolegomena for
future work and deeper investigations.

NT focuses on opening up possibilities for
active and creative self-development through reauthoring. As such it requires an understanding of
selves that is more protean and open-ended than
the modern, Western conception allows. Thus it
sets its face against a tradition of thought that identifies selves as enduring egos, entities that persist
and survive unscathed through change – it rejects
the picture of an “adamantine self – obdurate and
unchanging” (Kirmayer, 2003, p. 179). In place of
this notion of the self, NT looks to postmodernism
for inspiration.
The intellectual links between NT and poststructuralist/postmodern theory are so tight that
NT is sometimes dubbed “postmodern therapy”
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 54). Accordingly, NT is
fundamentally anti-essentialist when it comes to
thinking about selves. It is highly critical of “Western culture’s taken-for-granted understandings
that construct a self at the center of personhood”
(White, 2004, p. 32).
There is a tension, however, between adopting standard postmodern visions of the self and
NT’s fundamental commitment to the possibility
of personal transformations. Commitment to the
idea that individuals and groups can transform
themselves “separates these therapists from what
has been the view of postmodern philosophers that
the subject is a passive creation of social discourse”
(Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 65). Again, there is a need
to re-author NT’s official story: Polkinghorne goes
on to argue that “[narrative therapists] need to be
less impressed by the version of postmodernism
developed in the work of. . . French postmodern
philosophers and more aggressive in their presentation of their own version of an existentially
informed postmodernism of human self-creation”.
The challenge, then, is for NT therapists to become
“more assertive in their rejection of the empty and
powerless subject,” (Polkinghorne, 2004, p. 65).3
NT needs to say more precisely how we should

Alternative stories: Science,
folk psychology and the self

Science not scientism
The existing scientific literature lends broad
empirical support to NT’s working assumption
that certain narrative practices, those involving
particular kinds of rich storied content, used in
particular ways for particular purposes, correlates positively with mental health. A number of
findings demonstrate that people “who are able
to narrate the emotional events of their lives in
more self-reflective ways show better physical and
psychological health” (Fivush et al., 2010, p. 46).
Other findings also reveal that choice of narrative
is important to our well-being, showing that “How
we remember the stressful events of our lives
has an impact on our ability to cope” (Fivush &
McDermott-Sales, 2006, p. 125; McDermott Sales
et al., 2005). Coping is not here to be understood
as merely a backward looking matter of dealing
with a past event – it is also a forward-looking
matter dealing better with other, similar stressful
future happenings.
On the face of it, it appears that as long as
the goal and methods of scientific work are understood in appropriately modest ways, there is
no reason why NT could not benefit from direct
empirical assessment. Of course, any investigations would need to be conducted in ways that are
sensitive to the nature of NT. This seems entirely
possible (cf. Murdoch 2009, p. 509).
Indeed, taking care to identify appropriate measures and assessments, Vromans and Schweitzer
(2011) recently conducted the first rigorous empirical investigation of NT. Their findings report
effective improvement in depressive symptoms
and interpersonal relations after eight sessions
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of manualized NT with 47 adults with major
depressive disorder. Benchmarking and clinical
significance analyses used to evaluate outcomes
showed NT gains to be on a par with other widely
used forms of therapy, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Psychodynamic Interpersonal,
Prolonged Exposure Therapy. However, at a threemonth follow-up, it was found that only depressive symptoms and not interpersonal relatedness
improvements were maintained.4
Clearly NT proponents need to separate scientific wheat from scientistic chaff. There are
surely ways of elucidating and understanding the
scientific enterprise without construing it under
the guise of grand narrative scientism.

Folk psychology as narrative practice
The worry that NT is, at root, culturally biased
is motivated by NT’s commitment to understanding narrative practices through the lens of a Western “theory of mind” (hereafter ToM). On the face
of it, it seems hard to avoid this charge. Michael
White, for example, more than flirts with the idea
that NT is based on FP as a kind of culturally
inherited ToM. He confirms the standard story
that we need ToM “to comprehend the selves of
others” (White, 2004, p. 38). He also speaks of
FP, not as a practice, but as if it were something to
be “employed”, “put into service” – as something
that “equips us with a range of notions about what
makes people tick” (2004, p. 19).
To think of FP in this ToMish way encourages
a standard vision of how narrative practices relate
to and play a part in its development. It typically
promotes a ToM-first vision according to which
local narrative practices put the icing on a universally sourced ToM cake. Those who subscribe to
this view regard ToM as a universal theory about
how mental states enable personal agency in our
species. ToM is part of the basic equipment of all
normally developing individuals, whereas “narratives enable individuals to interface their theories
of mind in symbolic and literal action” (Russell et
al., 2004, p. 214, emphasis added). Accordingly
storytelling is a given culture’s normative strategy
through which a universal ToM is “conveyed,
developed and practiced” (Russell et al., 2004,

■ 163

p. 214). Defending this view would be defending
the view that seemingly Western notions of “personal agency” and “intentional states” are in fact
truly the universal core of all human FP practice.
There is another, better way for NT to understand the relation between FP and narrative
practices – one that allows it to be more appropriately sensitive to differences in those practices
across cultures. The alternative way to think about
FP gives pride of place to narrative practices in a
way that better suits NT, and which better fits the
known facts about FP practice and development.
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH) rejects
the idea that FP entails the existence of ToMs. It
understands FP as a competence fostered by engaging in socially supported storytelling activities
(Hutto, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2009, Gallagher &
Hutto, 2008).
The NPH holds that “storytelling practices
scaffold folk psychological reasoning, or reasoning
about one’s own and others’ reasons for acting”
(Herman, 2013, p. 94). Yet this does not imply that
engaging in narrative practices builds up a ToM
that was already present in weaker form. According to the NPH, engaging with narrative practices
does not put the icing on a pre-existing, universal
ToM cake. Instead it is through participating in
narrative practices that such a culturally local FP
cake is baked. Thus “it is FP that is facilitated by
narrative rather than vice versa” (Cobley, 2014,
p. 227; see also Herman, 2013, pp. 296–298).
FP is not monomorphic – one should expect the
forms and norms of our FP explanations to vary
systematically in line with local narrative practices
(see Hutto & Kirchhoff, forthcoming).
Of course, going this way only exacerbates
the worry that NT’s commitment to FP makes it
shallow and unscientific. How best to respond?
Undeniably, an uncritical commitment to FP can
promote oversimplified ideas and misleading pictures about how minds really work. Many are attracted to the idea that intentional attitudes – such
as beliefs, desires and emotions – are neatly and
discretely defined, causally efficacious, contentbearing inner states that figure in nicely staged
and sequenced linear processes and operations.
However, it seems the mind is messier than that.
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Putting emotion in the spotlight, Baumeister
et al. (2007) make this point vividly. They trade
the simplistic and intuitively appealing idea that
mental states directly cause behavior for a vision
of mental processing that understands cognitive
influence in more complex, dynamical and holistic
terms.
People will explain someone’s behavior in terms
of “because she was mad” or “because he was
afraid”, as opposed to saying “anger directed her
cognitive processing to focus disproportionately
on certain possible outcomes, whereupon her
behavioral decision process failed to take certain
potential risks into account” or “fear temporarily reordered his goal priorities, causing him to
abandon one goal in favor of the seemingly urgent
albeit irrational goal of escaping the situation
(Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 168).

Let us assume the second analysis is closer to
the truth. Even if it is, FP’s lack of transparency
about the underlying dynamics of mind is only a
problem for FP if it is assumed that FP is in the
business of trying to give causal explanations of
this sort in the first place. FP’s explanation will
only be deemed shallow if it is assumed that FP
and cognitive science are competing on this score.
If that is the case then one can motivate eliminativism about FP on the grounds that its explanations
are inferior to those of the cognitive sciences.
Once we construe FP as a narrative practice
that is not interested in offering causal explanations that compete with those of the cognitive sciences it becomes possible to view the relationship
between FP and cognitive science as cooperative,
not competing (see Hutto, 2011 for a detailed
argument). This fits with Kirmayer’s assessment
that we are “on the threshold of a renaissance,
in which complex-systems thinking will allow us
to integrate neuroscience, psychology, and the
social sciences” (Kirmayer, 2015, p. 1169). Viewing FP as a narrative practice – one that provides
normalizing explanations that are personal and
particular as opposed to causal explanations of a
general, mechanical sort – allows us to see how
our narratives can reveal new opportunities for
action, just as NT assumes. Embodied, enactive
and ecological approaches to mind are perfectly
poised to explicate the basis of “skills that are

evident in our ways of living, in our acts of life”
(White, 2004, p. 39). New thinking about how
we come to respond to affordances in embodied,
enactive ways holds out the promise of deeper illumination into how NT works, which may lead
to potential improvements.
One goal of cognitive science could be to to
investigate just how narrative activity manages to
affect changes in our skill set, without assuming
that FP explanations will form part of the best
mature explanation of this process. Adherents
of FP can agree, just as eliminativists claim, that
propositional attitudes directly causing actions is
unlikely to figure in our best developed scientific
accounts of the basic nature of minds and how
they operate (cf. Churchland, 2007). Hence, to
contend that FP doesn’t tell us much if anything
about the underlying dynamics of the mind is no
reason at all to dismiss person-focused therapeutic
approaches that make use of FP practices.

Selves as patterns
Are there ways for NT to get beyond its attachment to post-structuralist conceptions of
the decentered self? To embrace the concept of a
postmodern self, after all, is self-defeating for NT.
Rather than seeing the subject as a locus of control
over its individual life, the post-structuralist view
understands the subject to be the subjected – the
product of larger forces of language and power
(e.g., Foucault, 1988). But that means that any
post-structuralist bid for emancipation or selfmanagement appealing to narrative as a means
for self-formation would be seen as an illusion;
since language is not something under individual
control every individual is shaped by social forces.
In contrast, a pattern theory of self better suits
NT in suggesting that things are more complicated
than either the Cartesian extreme of total selfgovernance or the post-structuralist extreme of
a completely emaciated self (Gallagher, 2013). It
begins by acknowledging that there are determining forces of biology and sociality over which we
do not exercise control. The facticity of human
embodiment and the fact that we are necessarily
intersubjective beings place real (material) limits
on the type of identities that we can take on. At
the same time, however, these factors are enabling
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conditions that allow us to engage in actions and
joint endeavors that permit some degree of transcendence and freedom.
Narrative is double-barrelled in the same way.
Just as language places limitations on how we can
make ourselves understood, at the same time allowing for an infinite number of ways to express
ourselves, narrative practices likewise can be
conservative and reproductive, and yet offer the
resources for criticism and transformation. How is
this possible? In this regard, there are two important things to consider: (1) the nature of narrative
itself, specifically the concept of narrative distance,
and (2) the fact that we are not merely narrative
selves – narrators or narrated subjects.
First, narrative has a certain internal structure
described in the concept of narrative distance.
Narrative distance is a concept that goes back to
Aristotle’s Poetics. It indicates how far removed
the narrator is from the narrated events (Andringa,
1996; Lothe, 2000). For example, there is less
distance between the narrator and the narrated
events if the narration is done in the first person
versus third person (this is perspectival distance);
the amount of time between the narration and the
narrated events characterizes a temporal distance;
and the extent and the valence of the narrator’s
evaluation of the events (evaluative distance) can
also be a measure of narrative distance. Finally,
various interpretive aspects of narration introduce limitations and biases into the recounting of
events. All narrative recounting is an interpretation due to factors such as the narrator’s interest
or purpose, the audience and its expectations, etc.
(Bedwell et al., 2011; Gadamer, 1989; Ricoeur,
1981).
The same concept applies to autobiographical
(or self-) narrative. Specifically, there is always
some distance between the self who narrates and
the self who is narrated. When the narrator says,
for example, “I had a great journey,” the ‘I’ points
in two directions: to the narrator, signifying that
the narrator means to say something about herself;
and to the person or character whom the narrator
was, at some point in the past, during the journey.
The narrator implies an identity between herself
and the person she is talking about, but there
is necessarily some degree of difference or non-

■ 165

identity involved. Narrative distance allows for
some critical space to open up, and this itself can
introduce some degree of control and transformation in terms of how I want to understand myself.
This kind of critical narrative distance is essential
for self-management.
Second, this is not the whole story because we
are not just narrative selves. The capacity we have
for narrative is only one factor in a pattern of existence that includes biological and experiential factors, social and psychological factors, emotional
and situational factors. Narrative practices, and
the critical distance they can open up, can give us
some leverage for self-management and transformation; but they could provide no such leverage
unless we were also embodied beings able to act
and to have a sense of agency for such action. And
such action would be entirely unmotivated unless
we were already in the world and with others, engaged in joint actions or in oppositional reactions,
or retreating from such engagements because we
are depressed, or broken-hearted, or alienated or
traumatized.
A pattern theory of self emphasizes this multidimensional existence where possibilities outlined by
narrative are possibilities only because we are embodied actors situated in pragmatic contexts with
others. Therapy, or, importantly, self-management
can target any of these factors in order to target
them all. A change in narrative self-understanding
can modulate our intersubjective behaviors; a
change in bodily practices can transform our
narrative self-understanding; a change in worldly
circumstances, or mood, or instituted practice can
equally affect all the other factors that make us
who we are.

Conclusion
NT is aptly placed to inform approaches to the
self-management of mental health. Insofar as NT is
based on changing and developing self-narratives,
it supports those who abandon the idea that the
job of therapy is the expert treatment of afflicting
mental disorders and instead see it as working to
make individuals more adept and expert in coping with life challenges. NT strategies provide the
means for individuals to be actively and centrally
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engaged in the enhancement and maintenance of
their own well-being.
Unfortunately there has been ‘little focus on
what aspects of narrative representation may be
most fruitful to target for change or repair’ (Russell et al., 2004, p. 215). Apart from a philosophically informed re-authoring of NT’s official story,
another major agenda item is to determine which
kinds of narrative (identifying their special properties) and which practices (the way such narratives
are used) best aid promotion of psychosocial
well-being. Mental health policymakers should
be made aware of the promise of NT and take
it into account when recommending appropriate
courses of self-managed treatment and customized
assistance.

Notes
1. Vromans and Schweitzer report: “Currently, no
rigorous empirical support exists for narrative therapy.
The omission likely arises from fundamental differences
in theories of knowledge distinguishing postmodernist
from modernist thought” (Vromans & Schweitzer,
2011, p. 4).
2. This raises wider questions about other, epistemic
differences in the narrative practices of various cultures
about whether and how any given narratives “fit with
templates . . . exemplars of ‘good explanations’ . . .
external, cultural forms” (Kirmayer, 2003, p. 172).
3. The need for re-authoring is something leading
NT proponents accept. Epston raises the worry that
NT may be “becoming theoretically passé” (Epston,
2011, p. xxxvi).
4. Vromans and Schweitzer (2011) note that their
research “was limited by its small sample” and lacked
“generalizability” (Vromans & Schweitzer, 2011, p. 13).
This highlights the need for further comparative and
more in-depth research designed with larger samples
targeting a wider variety of populations and complaints.
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